Santilli v. Van Erp by Middle District of Florida
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT





v.   CASE NO. 8:17-cv-1797-T-33MAP





This is a defamation action stemming from a series of articles that Defendant, Dutch scientist
Pepijn Van Erp, posted on his personal blog.  Plaintiffs are a scientist and his wife who research
antimatter from their Florida laboratory.  Antimatter is the opposite of normal matter:  all sub-atomic
particles have an equivalent antimatter particle with opposite charge and quantum spin.  For
example, the electron has an antimatter counterpart called the positron with the same mass as an
electron but with a positive charge.  See “What is Antimatter,” http://www.physics.org/article-
questions.asp?id=105.  Revising the maxim that matter can be neither created nor destroyed,
scientists now believe that energy and mass are interchangeable – that when a particle collides with
its antiparticle, the two annihilate each other (antimatter annihilation), with their mass being entirely
converted into energy. Id.  The rub is that scientists barely detect any antimatter in the observable
universe.  If antimatter is the opposite of matter, shouldn’t there be an equal amount of both?  This
question has stumped nuclear physicists.  Antimatter can be artificially generated and studied in huge
particle accelerators, but this process is incredibly expensive.  See “The Five Greatest Mysteries of
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Antimatter,” (Apr. 22, 2009), www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227051-600-the-five-greatest-
mysteris-of-antimatter/.  Enter Plaintiff Ruggero Santilli, who claims to have developed a telescope
with a concave lens (rather than convex, as utilized by a traditional telescope) that can detect
antimatter (doc. 64, ex. A at 1).  He has posted articles about his discovery on the website for his
company Thunder Energies and in journals. 
Defendant Pepijn Van Erp finds Santilli’s discovery inherently suspect.  So much so that Van
Erp posted entries to his personal blog (www.pepijnvanerp.nl) titled “The Continuing Stupidity of
Ruggero Santilli,” “Finding JV Kadeisvili-or Mailing with Ruggero M. Santilli,” and “More Santilli
Shenanigans.” (doc. 30, exhs. A-C).   These posts inspired viewers’ comments, which read like a
nerd’s version of a fist fight.  With Santilli’s reputation as a cutting-edge research scientist on the
line, Plaintiffs sued Defendants in state court in April 2017 (see doc. 2), claiming Defendants’ online
attacks have defamed Santilli and tortiously interfered with their business of marketing and selling
the antimatter telescope (which Thunder Energies dubs the Santilli telescope).  Defendants removed
the case to this Court. 
Although the discovery deadline was yesterday (see doc. 15), on March 16, 2018, Plaintiffs
moved for the third time to preliminarily enjoin Defendants: they ask the Court to order Defendants
to revise the title of one blog post and to remove defamatory content from another (doc. 64).1  After
reviewing Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (doc. 64), their exhibits in support (Id. at
exhs. A-C, Defendants Pepijn Van Erp and Frank Israel’s response (doc. 69), and Plaintiffs’
operative complaint (doc. 30), I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion.
1  The District Judge referred this matter to me for a report and recommendation (doc. 65). 
After my review of the relevant filings, I find that a hearing would not be helpful in resolving this
issue.
2
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A. Facts
In February 2016, Van Erp posted the blog entry “The Continuing Stupidity of Ruggero
Santilli” to his website (doc. 30, ex. A).  He attached a link to a You Tube video by Thunder
Energies titled “Thunder Energies Discovers Invisible Entities” that touts the Santilli telescope’s
ability to detect antimatter galaxies, antimatter asteroids, and antimatter cosmic rays.  Van Erp
attempts to debunk Santilli’s findings: 
This claim by Santilli might be the easiest to debunk of all the extraordinary claims
he has made (like the existence of magnecules and his alternative explanation for
why the sun colors red when it sets).  The whole concept of antimatter-light is
bullshit, because the anti-particle of a photon is simply a photon.  So if you want to
speak of antimatter-light it’s no different than ‘normal’ light.  ‘Anti-matter light’ will
therefore not focus with a concave lens.  I will not bother trying to give explanations
for the grainy images he took with his Santilli-‘out-of-focus’-telescope which he
claims show Invisible Terrestrial Entities.
(doc. 30, ex. A at 1-2).  Van Erp’s criticisms continue: “Santilli writes that he has an article on this
discovery of Invisible Terrestrial Entities in press with the American Journal of Modern Physics. 
That’s just one of those fake journals, which will probably print anything if you are willing to pay
their fees.” (Id. at 2).  What follows is a string of comments by readers, who look to be scientists,
amateur physicists, and followers of the paranormal.  Most of these comments are critical of Santilli
and his research; those that defend it are posted by a “Frank Stone,” who Van Erp posits is actually
Santilli.  (Id. at 6).  Some of the comments are benign – “Joaquim” writes, “I’m not really a young
person and I’ve been building optics and telescopes since my youth, as a hobby.  When I saw the
telescope and that confirmation article, I thought something weird was going on, maybe I was going
crazy or the laws of the universe changed while I wasn’t looking.  I just wanted to thank Mr. Pepijn
for restoring my mental sanity.” (Id. at 4).  And some comments are just plain mean – “Christian
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Corda” writes, “ ‘ Mr. Stone,’ you are Santilli because you have not the balls to use your real name. 
It is better having my job rather than being a poor old and crackpot man obsessed by false
conspiracies like you.”  (Id.).  Mostly the comments are a pseudo slug-fest between Van Erp in one
corner and Frank Stone in the other.
In August 2016, Van Erp posted “More Santilli Shenanigans” to his blog (doc. 30, ex. C). 
This article summarizes Santilli’s reaction to Van Erp’s earlier articles, “The Continuing Stupidity
of Ruggero Santilli” and “Finding JV Kadeisvili – or Mailing with Ruggero M Santilli.”2 
Apparently, Santilli had sent Van Erp a cease and desist letter through his counsel, which Van Erp
blogged about.  What most offends Santilli from “More Santilli Shenanigans” – the language he asks
the Court to order Van Erp to remove – is Van Erp’s accusation that Santilli fabricated an award and
bestowed it upon himself:
To most people it will be clear that this award was instigated by mr. S himself and
that he just asked his co-worker Georgiev to organize the signatures.  There is a clue
that this piece of paper was doctored at the offices of mr. S: the filename of the
picture is ‘TARPON_2.jpg’, which points to the address of his business (1444
Rainville Road, Tarpon Springs, Florida).  Im sure that these are just two more events
we can add to the long list of fringe activities on Santilli’s curriculum vitae.
(doc. 30, ex. C at 4).3
2  This article accuses Santilli of reacting to criticisms of his work by publishing articles in
support of his research under pseudonyms.  Van Erp writes:  “The board of the company is filled
with relatives.  His son is now CEO, his daughter in law CFO and they all pay themselves good
salaries.  Meanwhile, the company is making losses which run in the millions since start-up.  It looks
like a pyramid scheme.” (doc. 64, ex. B).  While this article is included as an exhibit to Plaintiffs’
preliminary injunction motion, it is not addressed in the motion.  Thus, I do not address it specifically
here.  
3  This article is not included as an exhibit to Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion,
although it is clearly a focus of the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek.  However, it is attached to their
second amended complaint (doc. 30, ex. C).
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“The Continuing Stupidity of Ruggero Santilli” appears second in a Google search of Santilli
(see doc. 64, ex. C).  Plaintiffs allege that Van Erp’s blog has scared off potential investors in
Thunder Energies, and they attach two affidavits to their motion from consultants saying just that
(Id.).  
B. Analysis
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish four elements: (1) substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it would be irreparably harmed if injunctive relief were
denied; (3) that the threatened injury to them outweighs whatever damage the injunction may cause
to the party to be enjoined; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest.  Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 262 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).  “A
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that should not be granted unless the
movant clearly carries [the] burden of persuasion on each of [the four] prerequisites.”  Suntrust Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001).
1. Availability of Injunctive Relief
Before diving into the analysis of whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate, I must
consider whether injunctive relief is even available to Plaintiffs under these circumstances.4  Under
4  Although Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction collectively refers to
“Defendants,” they do not explain how Defendants Frank Israel and Hosting2Go fit into the fact
pattern.  In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs contend Israel (a professor of astronomy in
the Netherlands) directed Van Erp to write the blog entries and assisted him with the task (doc. 30
at 5).  But Israel’s name is not on the blog posts, and he submitted a declaration in support of his
motion to dismiss stating that he did not contribute to the articles in any fashion (doc. 35 at 1). 
Defendant Hosting2Go is the Netherlands-based server that hosts Van Erp’s website.  Although
neither side addresses this, under the Communications Decency Act, “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).   Courts hold that an “interactive
computer service” is entitled to “broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
5
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Florida law, there is a “well-settled rule prohibiting injunctive relief in defamation cases.”  Baker
v. Joseph, 938 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2013); see Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133
So.3d 1086, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (finding injunctive relief unavailable to prohibit defamatory
or libelous statements); Dolen v. Ryals, No. 8:09-cv-2120-T-23AEP, 2010 WL 2079657, at * 1
(M.D. Fla. May 24, 2010) (adhering to the majority view that absent extraordinary circumstances
injunctions should not issue in defamation cases). 
If the allegedly defamatory statements constitute or are incidental to conduct that constitutes
intentional interference with a potentially advantageous business relationship, however, there is a
limited exception to the general rule that equitable relief is unavailable in defamation cases. 
Murtagh v. Hurley, 40 So.3d 62, 66-67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Zimmerman v. D.C.A. at Welleby, Inc.,
505 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).  But there must be an independent basis for invoking equitable
jurisdiction.  Murtagh, 40 So. 3d at 65, citing Zimmerman, 505 So. 2d at 1373.  In other words,
Plaintiffs must establish a clear legal right to injunctive relief on their tortious interference claims
because, standing alone, injunctive relief is unavailable on their defamation claims. 
2. Tortious Interference with Business Relations
It is clear from Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint that they only nominally sue for tortious
interference with a business relationship; defamation is the crux of their case.  Most of their
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.  Roca Labs,
Inc. v. Consumer Op. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2015), quoting Almeida v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006).  An “interactive computer service” is
defined as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server. . . .”  Id. at § 230(f)(2).  Plaintiffs do not
discuss whether Hosting2Go is an interactive computer service rather than an information content
provider.  Regardless, for other reasons Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on their
defamation and tortious interference claims.
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complaint alludes to Van Erp’s allegedly “false,” “malicious,” and “disparaging” statements about
Santilli on his blog.  But, in any event, Plaintiffs have not established that they likely will succeed
on their tortious interference claim.  To prevail, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a business
relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the opposing party; (3) an intentional
and unjustified interference with the relationship by the opposing party; and (4) damage to the
plaintiff as a result of the breach of that relationship.  Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc.,
647 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994).  A plaintiff does not have to prove the existence of an enforceable
contract for a particular business relationship to be protected.  Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton,
463 So.2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1985).  But there must be proximate cause, or an understanding between
the plaintiff and the prospective customer or client that would have been consummated but for the
defendant’s interference.  Ethan Allen, 647 So. 2d at 814.  A mere offer to sell cannot, by itself,
support a tortious interference with a business relationship claim.  Id. 
Plaintiffs stumble over the first element of the cause of action.  Plaintiffs submit the affidavit
of Timothy Scott Wainwright, a “professional management consultant for public companies.” (doc.
64, ex. C. at 1).  Wainwright does not specify whom he works for or his relationship to Plaintiffs. 
I deduce that Plaintiffs have retained Wainwright to help market what he calls a Directional Neutron
Source (DNS), Santilli-designed technology “intended for scanning of nuclear materials that could
be smuggled into suitcase[s] and other containers” (Id.) (whether this is the same thing as the Santilli
telescope, I cannot venture a guess).  Wainwright attests to receiving marketing material (“including
a brochure”) from Plaintiffs to assist with “commercializing the equipment.” (Id.).  On closer look,
it is not Plaintiffs’ potential business relationship with Wainwright that Defendants have allegedly
disrupted.  What Wainwright avers is that Van Erp’s blog posts have interfered with his ability to
7
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develop business relationships with unnamed and unknown potential investors on Plaintiffs’ behalf. 
This is not the proximate cause contemplated by Florida law. 
The second affidavit fares no better.  It is by Scott Tadsen, an “investment and security
specialist” who seeks “funding to market this pre-production equipment which is technology
intended for scanning of nuclear materials that could be smuggled into suitcase[s] and other
containers.” (doc. 64, ex. C at 3).  Tadsen attests that a Google search of Santilli “stops and hinders
many people in their tracks as they will not even take the time to go further in their due diligence and
instantly reject Plaintiff.” (Id. at 4).  Again, Tadsen’s relationship with Plaintiffs is unclear, he does
not offer specifics of his job or of his potential customers, and he does not clarify if he was
negotiating with a potential investor who was stopped “in their tracks” by what they learned about
Santilli online.5  On this basis alone, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is due to be denied.
2. Defamation
a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Plaintiffs also are not likely to succeed on the merits of their defamation claims.6  To meet
the requirements for defamation under Florida law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) publication; (2) falsity;
(3) the statement was made with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter
concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual
5  Plaintiffs also cannot meet the other elements of the tort.  Indeed, even if Van Erp intended
to interfere with Plaintiffs’ business dealings (a big “if” – Plaintiffs offer no proof of this), there is
no business relationship for him to interfere with, and Plaintiffs do not detail to any degree the
damages they suffered as a result of Van Erp’s blog.   
6  This is especially so for Plaintiff Carla Santilli.  The allegedly defamatory statements are
not aimed at her.  See Thomas v. Jacksonville Television, Inc., 699 So.2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA
1997) (holding that cause of action for group libel cannot be maintained unless libelous statements
are of and concerning the plaintiff).
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damages; and (5) statement must be defamatory.  Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir.
2018);  Internet Sol. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201, 1214 n.8 (Fla. 2010).  Libel is “the
publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words.”  Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944
So.2d 460, 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  Statements are libelous per se if they impute to someone a
felonious act.  Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., 650 F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D. Fla. 1986).    Greenbelt
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 12 (1970). 
Therefore, true statements, statements that are not readily capable of being proven false, and
statements of pure opinion are protected from defamation actions by the First Amendment.  Turner
v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2018), citing Keller v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 778 F.2d
711, 714-15 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Florida law).7  Doctrinal protections preserve “the breathing
space which freedoms of expression require in order to survive.”  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted).  Under Florida law, a
defendant publishes a “pure opinion” when he comments or opines on facts set forth in the
publication or otherwise known or available to the reader as a member of the public.  Id.  “Mixed
expression of opinion occurs when an opinion or comment is made which is based upon facts
regarding the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated in the publication or assumed to exist
by the parties to the communication.”  Id.  Whether a statement is fact or opinion, and whether a
statement of fact is susceptible to defamatory interpretation, are questions of law for the court.  Id. 
A court should consider statements in their totality, “with attention given to any cautionary terms
7    The District Judge denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss in an endorsed order, deciding
that the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants (see docs. 66-68).  Neither side
addresses whether Van Erp, a Dutch citizen who resides in the Netherlands, can assert First
Amendment concerns; but if he can be called into court here, it follows that he can assert all
available defenses to the claims against him.
9
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used by the publisher in qualifying the statement.”  Id., citing Keller, 778 F.2d at 717.
Plaintiffs’ complaint focuses on the following allegedly defamatory statements:  Van Erp
refers to Santilli as a “fringe scientist,” a “mad professor,” and a “cunning scam artist” who publishes
articles in “fake” journals; he accuses Santilli of fabricating awards; Van Erp writes that Santilli uses
pseudonyms online to compliment his own work;8 and Santilli pays to have his research published
(doc. 30 at 5).  All in all, “[t]he very nature of the subject matter, tone and insinuations of The
Subject Articles, along with stating that Ruggero is continuing in stupidity, reflects negatively on
Ruggero in his profession as a scientist and an inventor.” (Id.)
Read in context, a reasonable reader would recognize Van Erp’s posts as inviting intellectual
rivals to engage in a scientific disagreement.  Labeling Santilli a “mad professor,” and a “fringe
scientist,” are subjective assessments of Santilli’s work and not readily capable of being proven true
or false.  Id. at 1264, citing Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 697 (11th Cir. 2016)
(explaining difference between statements of opinion and statements of fact, noting that statements
of fact are “readily capable of being proven true or false”).  Although Plaintiffs complain that these
terms reflect negatively on Santilli’s reputation, this does not transform Van Erp’s assessment of
Santilli into anything other than his opinion.  Notably too, Van Erp includes links to Santilli-created
content – websites and articles of Santilli’s original research – and links to other primary sources he
consulted in forming his (often scathing) rebuttal.  Under Florida law, commentary or opinion based
on accurate facts set forth in an article “are not the stuff of libel.”  Id. at 1265 (collecting cases).  
Van Erp’s comment that Santilli is a “cunning scam artist,” standing alone, may be construed
8  Van Erp argues that the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims has run on
these statements.  Although he claims the article “Finding JV Kadeisvili – or Mailing with Ruggero
Santilli” was first published on May 30, 2013, that is not clear from the record.
10
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as accusing him of a crime.  Here is the entire comment: “Is Santilli just a mad professor?  Or is he
a cunning scam artist trying to sell his ‘Santilli-ofocus-scopes’ (or even better: stock in his
businesses) to people who fall easily for sciency sounding nonsense?  Maybe both ...” (doc. 64, ex.
A at 2).  This statement – in the form of a question – is non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole that a
reasonable reader would interpret as a “vigorous epithet” offered by a scientist who considers
Santilli’s theories and inventions the stuff of science fiction.  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17, quoting
Greenbelt Coop., 398 U.S. at 13-14.
At bottom, this quarrel between Santilli and Van Erp arises from both sides’ research into
theories that are almost 100 years old regarding how to reconcile combined quantum mechanics with
Einstein’s theory of relativity.  In this context, and considering the cutting-edge nature of Santilli’s
research into antimatter’s theoretical applications, a reasonable reader would expect zealous debate. 
Significantly, readers were invited to respond to Van Erp’s criticism of Santilli as a part of an
interactive online discussion.  Some of these comments were favorable to Santilli’s scientific
theories, some were not.  The media vehicle Van Erp chose – blog posts on his personal website –
is popular for just this type of debate, and is the type of online forum where a reasonable person
expects to find controversy and accompanying rhetoric.9  I find that Plaintiffs are not likely to
9  As an aside, I note that if Plaintiffs’ defamation claims fail, their claims for tortious
interference with potential business relationships also must fail.  See Ovadia v. Bloom, 756 So.2d
137, 140-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).  Florida adheres to the single publication rule: a single publication
may give rise to only a single cause of action, and plaintiffs “may not proceed on multiple claims for
the same challenged defamatory actions.”  Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Op. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-
2096-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 6389657, at * 6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2014) (citation and quotations
omitted) (adopting report and recommendation).  This rule applies to tortious interference claims
based on allegedly defamatory statements.  Plaintiffs’ causes of action are all based on the same blog
posts; in other words, their tortious interference claims fail because they arise from the same
publication upon which their failed defamation claims are based.  Id., quoting Orlando Sports
Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). 
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succeed on their defamation claims.10
b. Irreparable harm
Undermining their pleas of irreparable harm, this is the third time Plaintiffs have moved for
injunctive relief.  They filed an “emergency” motion for preliminary injunction (doc. 42) in
December 2017 but withdrew it the same day (doc. 43).  A month later, they moved for a preliminary
injunction again (doc. 45) and in February 2018, after Defendants expended the time, effort, and
attorney’s fees to respond, Plaintiffs moved to amend their motion (which I granted, denying their
then-pending motion as moot) (docs. 53, 54).  A month and a half after that, they filed the instant
motion (doc. 64).  In sum, Van Erp’s posts occurred in February and August of 2016 (Plaintiffs do
not state when they learned of them), but Plaintiffs did not file suit until April 2017, and then waited
until March 2018 to follow through on a motion for an injunction.  A preliminary injunction requires
showing “imminent” irreparable harm.  Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th
Cir. 2016) (citation and quotations omitted).  “[A] delay of even [ ] a few months” in moving for a
preliminary injunction “militates against a finding of irreparable harm.”  Id.  The delay of almost a
year between filing suit and finally moving for an injunction “conclusively refutes the claim of an
imminent and irreparable injury.”  Kazal v. Price, No. 17-cv-2945-T-23AAS, 2017 WL 6270086,
at * 3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2017). 
c. Balance of harms
An injunction issues only if the prospective harm to the movant from denying the injunction
10  Plaintiffs also do not specify their damages, stating instead that they “are not measurable
and cannot be recouped through civil remedy, [so] injunctive relief is appropriate.” (doc. 64 at 3). 
For the reasons explained above, injunctive relief generally is not appropriate in defamation cases,
and this case is no exception.
12
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outweighs the harm to the non-moving party from enjoining specific conduct.  Santilli contends that 
Van Erp’s statements on his blog have tarnished his reputation, trashed his credibility as a scientist,
and caused “serious financial harm to businesses associated with Plaintiffs and third parties, by
hurting their reputation, creating a devaluation of certain companies in which the Plaintiffs are
shareholders, and creating doubt in the credibility of Ruggero and his scientific findings and
businesses.” (doc. 30 at 6-7).  Wainwright and Tadsen’s affidavits claim that the posts have scared
off potential investors but do not identify a business transaction that failed as a proximate result of
the posts.  Based on these purported harms, Plaintiffs claim that the balance of equities favors an
injunction.
Plaintiffs insist that Defendants “would not be harmed at all” if an injunction restrains Van
Erp’s speech.  But the Supreme Court has roundly rejected prior restraint as “the most serious and
least tolerable infringement on [a person’s] First Amendment rights.”  Nebraska Press Ass’n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (collecting cases).  Van Erp’s First Amendment interests weigh
heavily against a preliminary injunction.  Plaintiffs fail to show that a balance of equities favors
restraining Van Erp’s speech.  
d. Public’s interest
Prior restraints are the most serious and intolerable of First Amendment infringements. 
Plaintiffs offer no extraordinary circumstance to justify overriding the strong public policy against
imposing a prior restraint on speech.  Gunder’s Auto Ctr. v. State Farm Ins., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1222,
1225 (M.D. Fla. 2009).  Therefore, the public’s interest weighs heavily against an injunction, which
would operate here as a court-ordered infringement of protected speech.  
13
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e. Rule 65
Under Rule 65(c), “[t]he court may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant
gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained
by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”  In addition to the above reasons
Plaintiffs’ motion is deficient, Plaintiffs also do not mention a bond amount.  
C. Conclusion
I recommend:
(1) Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (doc. 64) be DENIED. 
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED in Tampa, Florida on April 20, 2018.
NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from this date to file written objections to the Report and
Recommendation’s factual findings and legal conclusions.  A party’s failure to file written objections
waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion
the district judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation.  See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
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